Friday, May 29, 2009

Exploding debt threatens America

Standard and Poor’s decision to downgrade its outlook for British sovereign debt from “stable” to “negative” should be a wake-up call for the US Congress and administration. Let us hope they wake up.

Under President Barack Obama’s budget plan, the federal debt is exploding. To be precise, it is rising – and will continue to rise – much faster than gross domestic product, a measure of America’s ability to service it. The federal debt was equivalent to 41 per cent of GDP at the end of 2008; the Congressional Budget Office projects it will increase to 82 per cent of GDP in 10 years. With no change in policy, it could hit 100 per cent of GDP in just another five years.

“A government debt burden of that [100 per cent] level, if sustained, would in Standard & Poor’s view be incompatible with a triple A rating,” as the risk rating agency stated last week.

I believe the risk posed by this debt is systemic and could do more damage to the economy than the recent financial crisis. To understand the size of the risk, take a look at the numbers that Standard and Poor’s considers. The deficit in 2019 is expected by the CBO to be $1,200bn (€859bn, £754bn). Income tax revenues are expected to be about $2,000bn that year, so a permanent 60 per cent across-the-board tax increase would be required to balance the budget. Clearly this will not and should not happen. So how else can debt service payments be brought down as a share of GDP?

Inflation will do it. But how much? To bring the debt-to-GDP ratio down to the same level as at the end of 2008 would take a doubling of prices. That 100 per cent increase would make nominal GDP twice as high and thus cut the debt-to-GDP ratio in half, back to 41 from 82 per cent. A 100 per cent increase in the price level means about 10 per cent inflation for 10 years. But it would not be that smooth – probably more like the great inflation of the late 1960s and 1970s with boom followed by bust and recession every three or four years, and a successively higher inflation rate after each recession.

The fact that the Federal Reserve is now buying longer-term Treasuries in an effort to keep Treasury yields low adds credibility to this scary story, because it suggests that the debt will be monetised. That the Fed may have a difficult task reducing its own ballooning balance sheet to prevent inflation increases the risks considerably. And 100 per cent inflation would, of course, mean a 100 per cent depreciation of the dollar. Americans would have to pay $2.80 for a euro; the Japanese could buy a dollar for Y50; and gold would be $2,000 per ounce. This is not a forecast, because policy can change; rather it is an indication of how much systemic risk the government is now creating.

Why might Washington sleep through this wake-up call? You can already hear the excuses.

“We have an unprecedented financial crisis and we must run unprecedented deficits. While there is debate about whether a large deficit today provides economic stimulus, there is no economic theory or evidence that shows that deficits in five or 10 years will help to get us out of this recession. Such thinking is irresponsible. If you believe deficits are good in bad times, then the responsible policy is to try to balance the budget in good times. The CBO projects that the economy will be back to delivering on its potential growth by 2014. A responsible budget would lay out proposals for balancing the budget by then rather than aim for trillion-dollar deficits.

“But we will cut the deficit in half.” CBO analysts project that the deficit will be the same in 2019 as the administration estimates for 2010, a zero per cent cut.

“We inherited this mess.” The debt was 41 per cent of GDP at the end of 1988, President Ronald Reagan’s last year in office, the same as at the end of 2008, President George W. Bush’s last year in office. If one thinks policies from Reagan to Bush were mistakes does it make any sense to double down on those mistakes, as with the 80 per cent debt-to-GDP level projected when Mr Obama leaves office?

The time for such excuses is over. They paint a picture of a government that is not working, one that creates risks rather than reduces them. Good government should be a nonpartisan issue. I have written that government actions and interventions in the past several years caused, prolonged and worsened the financial crisis. The problem is that policy is getting worse not better. Top government officials, including the heads of the US Treasury, the Fed, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Securities and Exchange Commission are calling for the creation of a powerful systemic risk regulator to reign in systemic risk in the private sector. But their government is now the most serious source of systemic risk.

The good news is that it is not too late. There is time to wake up, to make a mid-course correction, to get back on track. Many blame the rating agencies for not telling us about systemic risks in the private sector that lead to this crisis. Let us not ignore them when they try to tell us about the risks in the government sector that will lead to the next one.

The writer, a professor of economics at Stanford and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the author of ‘Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions Caused, Prolonged, and Worsened the Financial Crisis’

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/71520770-4a2c-11de-8e7e-00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check=1

That Freshman Course Won’t Be Quite the Same

MY day job is teaching introductory economics to about 700 Harvard undergraduates a year. Lately, when people hear that, they often ask how the economic crisis is changing what’s offered in a freshman course.

They’re usually disappointed with my first answer: not as much as you might think. Events have been changing so quickly that we teachers are having trouble keeping up. Syllabuses are often planned months in advance, and textbooks are revised only every few years.

But there is another, more fundamental reason: Despite the enormity of recent events, the principles of economics are largely unchanged. Students still need to learn about the gains from trade, supply and demand, the efficiency properties of market outcomes, and so on. These topics will remain the bread-and-butter of introductory courses.

Nonetheless, the teaching of basic economics will need to change in some subtle ways in response to recent events. Here are four:

THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS Students have always learned that the purpose of the financial system is to direct the resources of savers, who have extra funds they are willing to lend, to investors, who have projects that need financing.

The economy’s financial institutions — banks and insurance companies, for example — are mentioned as part of that system. But after a brief introduction in the classroom, they quickly fade into the background and are examined in detail only in more advanced courses.

The current crisis, however, has found these financial institutions at the center of the action. They will need to become more prominent in the classroom as well.

Financial institutions are like the stagehands who work behind the scenes at the theater. If they are there doing their jobs well, the audience can easily forget their presence. But if they fail to show up for work one day, their absence is very apparent, because the show can’t go on. The process of financial intermediation is similarly most noteworthy when it fails.

THE EFFECTS OF LEVERAGE Not long ago, I was explaining to a freshman that the economic crisis arose because some financial institutions had, in effect, invested in housing by holding mortgage-backed securities. When housing prices fell by about 20 percent nationwide, these institutions found themselves nearly insolvent.

But the student then asked an important question: “If housing prices have fallen only 20 percent, why did the banks lose almost 100 percent of their money?”

The answer was leverage, the use of borrowed money to amplify gains and, in this case, losses. Economists have yet to figure out what combination of mass delusion and perverse incentives led banks to undertake so much leverage. But there is no doubt that its effects have played a central role in the crisis and will need a more prominent place in the economics curriculum.

THE LIMITS OF MONETARY POLICY The textbook answer to recessions is simple: When the economy suffers from high unemployment and reduced capacity utilization, the central bank can cut interest rates and stimulate the demand for goods and services. When businesses see higher demand, they hire more workers to meet it.

Only rarely in the past did students ask what would happen if the central bank cut interest rates all the way to zero and it still wasn’t enough to get the economy going again. That is no surprise; after all, interest rates near zero weren’t something that they, or even their parents, had ever experienced. But now, with the Federal Reserve’s target interest rate at zero to 0.25 percent, that question is much more pressing.

The Fed is acting with the conviction that it has other tools to put the economy back on track. These include buying a much broader range of financial assets than it typically includes in its portfolio. Students will need to know about these other tools of monetary policy — and will also need to know that economists are far from certain how well these tools work.

THE CHALLENGE OF FORECASTING It is fair to say that this crisis caught most economists flat-footed. In the eyes of some people, this forecasting failure is an indictment of the profession.

But that is the wrong interpretation. In one way, the current downturn is typical: Most economic slumps take us by surprise. Fluctuations in economic activity are largely unpredictable.

Yet this is no reason for embarrassment. Medical experts cannot forecast the emergence of diseases like swine flu and they can’t even be certain what paths the diseases will then take. Some things are just hard to predict.

Likewise, students should understand that a good course in economics will not equip them with a crystal ball. Instead, it will allow them to assess the risks and to be ready for surprises.

N. Gregory Mankiw is a professor of economics at Harvard. He was an adviser to President George W. Bush.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/24/business/economy/24view.html?_r=1

Thursday, May 21, 2009

Full Faith and Overextended Credit

Monday, March 30, 2009

The federal government’s long-term budget could bring about a financial crisis that surpasses the current one.

Who do you think is more reliable—the full faith and credit of the United States backing up Treasury bonds, or the McDonald’s Corporation, backed only by “billions and billions served”? By some market measures it is the latter, and for good reason. The price of credit defaults swaps guaranteeing payment on 10-year Treasury bonds has risen by 1000 percent since December 2007, with an implied 12 percent probability of default on government debt over the next decade, according to data from Credit Market Analysis. In the view of the markets, this makes U.S. government bonds a more risky proposition than debt issued by McDonald’s.

Why? Trillion dollar annual short-term budget deficits due to the recession and financial crisis will soon merge with even larger deficits generated by government entitlement programs like Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. While a large short-term deficit to stimulate the economy can be absorbed, large deficits running for decades simply cannot be. Over the next decade, the combined costs of the big three entitlement programs will rise by 2.1 percent of gross domestic product; over the following decade, entitlement costs will increase by an additional 3.1 percent of GDP, with costs continuing to grow thereafter.

The quip that the U.S. government will soon be nothing more than a pension plan with an Army has more truth than one would think. And the purchaser of a 30-year Treasury bond would be wise to bear this fact in mind. Without significant retrenching, the federal government’s long-term budget capacity is not simply uncertain. It is certain to fail, bringing about a second financial crisis that could rival or surpass the current one.

Credit rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s have warned that ratings on U.S. sovereign debt could be downgraded if debt continues to rise. If sovereign debt ratings were driven entirely by fiscal balances, as Standard & Poor’s says in the case over the long run, the United States would lose its AAA rating in the year 2017—coincidentally, the year in which Social Security first begins running deficits. Five years later, Treasury bonds would decline to an A rating, around where Greece is today. By the early 2030s Treasury bonds would be speculative grade—junk.

It is almost trite to say that these trends are “unsustainable.” But what does that mean—what could actually happen if we continue to do nothing in the face of steeply rising costs of programs for the elderly?

If government budget deficits were financed out of domestic saving, the likely outcome would simply be a slow economic decline. Americans’ savings would finance current government consumption rather than future private sector investment, thereby lowering productivity, wages, and economic growth while raising unemployment and interest rates. And yet, this may be a better case scenario than reality.

The danger of a hard landing lies in the fact that federal deficits are financed not through domestic saving but by the willingness of foreigners to lend us money. The current account deficit of 4.7 percent of GDP represents the difference between domestic investment and the domestic saving available to finance it. In other words, it is the net amount that, as a nation, we are borrowing from abroad. Should federal deficits rise as projected and saving remain unchanged, a current account deficit double today’s level is easily imaginable.

What could trigger a crisis is the fact that almost all this borrowing from abroad is denominated in dollars, a luxury almost unique to the United States as an international reserve currency. The upshot of this is that any devaluation of the dollar is a comparable default on debt to foreign borrowers. To give the scale of things, a 2005 Congressional Research Service study said that a devaluation ranging from 10 to 56 percent would return the current account to sustainable levels, on par with currency declines during the 1997–1998 Asian Financial Crisis.

Now, some will argue that markets have actually given a vote of confidence to the United States, with Treasury interest rates at record lows and the dollar rising significantly over the past year. Yet these steps are largely the result of foreign governments and affiliated sovereign wealth funds propping up the dollar, knowing that any devaluation would hit their existing dollar holdings. In other words, foreign lenders are for now doubling down their bets on U.S. government. Yet there is clear evidence that some are getting worried.

Just recently, China’s premier Wen Jiabao said, “We have lent a huge amount of money to the U.S., so of course we are concerned about the safety of our assets. Frankly speaking, I do have some worries.” Wen called on the U.S. to “maintain its credibility, honor its commitments and guarantee the security of Chinese assets.”

Likely the only thing keeping the Chinese in the game is that they would suffer more than anyone if the dollar depreciated, as they hold over $3 trillion in dollar-denominated securities. But the Chinese are not putting all their eggs in one basket: they’ve also talked in recent days of setting up a new reserve currency managed by the International Monetary Fund as an alternative to the dollar.

This should worry Americans, since should any large investor choose to flee the dollar, others may fear being the last one standing when the music stops. But what would happen then?

The dollar would drop precipitously, meaning that businesses and consumers would face sharply higher prices for imports. With less foreign capital flowing into the country, interest rates could be expected to increase significantly, raising mortgage rates for homeowners, lowering the stock and bond markets, and reducing investment by businesses. Rising interest rates could trigger defaults on mortgages and other loans, spreading throughout the economy. While a dollar decline would be good for the export sector of the economy, it would also imply large economic dislocations as labor and capital devoted to domestic production shift to export-oriented industries. All told, the costs to the fragile U.S. economy could be large.

How likely is this scenario to occur? In the short term, not very. But as University of California economist Sebastian Edwards has shown, the higher the current account deficit the more likely it is for the country to experience a hard landing when that day of reckoning occurs.

While short-term deficits are justified if tied to genuinely stimulative fiscal policy, long-term deficits must be put under control. While the preferable way to do so is through spending reductions rather than tax increases, the broader point is that Americans and their elected representatives must come to terms with the mismatch between what they desire from government programs and how much they are willing to pay in taxes to finance those programs. Addressing the U.S. fiscal gap will require significant changes to Americans’ expectations regarding government taxes and services, but the necessary changes—and the chance of an economic crisis—will only grow if action is delayed.

http://74.125.153.132/search?q=cache:G27Es4cz4foJ:www.american.com/archive/2009/march

-2009/full-faith-and-overextended-credit+full-faith-and-overextended-credit&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=sg

Wednesday, May 20, 2009

How Much Would You Sell 10 Years of Your Life For?

For some strange reason, I was taking a shower when this philosophical question popped in my head and got me really thinking. So, I decided to talk about it in this post.

How much would you sell 10 years of your life for? If someone came and offered you the chance to sell 10 years of your life, what price would you ask for it.

For example, if you asked for $1 million, you will get the cash RIGHT NOW and lose 10 years of your life. So, if you were 20 years old today, you would immediately fast forward to 30. If you were 30 today, you would immediately go to 40. So on and so forth.

What price would you ask for? Think about it. You are not allowed to say 'not for sale' or 'priceless'. You must think of a price.

When I asked most of my friends, they gave huge amounts of money. One of my friends said, ' $10 million for 10 years of my life'. So, if we put so much value on the time of our life, are we treasuring
it?

For example, for my friend, $10 million for 10 years equates to $1 million a year, which equates to $2,739 per day. This equates to $114 per hour or $1.90 per minute. Do the math for YOUR OWN answer.

I bet it would be pretty high as well.

So, question is, are you living each hour as if it were WORTH $114? I am not saying that you must spend every hour making money. What I am saying is whether you are getting the very most out of the precious minutes and hours of your life?

Are you enjoying the journey of your life, allowing yourself to be happy or do you keep getting upset over small things? Are you loving the people around you and allowing them to love you back?
Are you treasuring each hour of your life and living it to the fullest or constantly procrastinating or doing things later?

Whether you like it or -- you have to SELL! If you think about it, you are forced to sell the 10 years of your life (and more), whether you like it or not.

Every day that passes in your life, you have just sold it. You are never going to get it back. Every hour that passes in your life, you are never going to get back.

When people attend my 4 day seminars, I tell them that the money they spent can always be made back. What cannot be made back is the 4 days of their life that they have exchanged for coming. So, they have to make the very best use of it.

So, before you go about living this new day, think of the price you have put on it and get your money's worth!

Adam Khoo

(Copied from email)


Trách nhiệm của doanh nghiệp phát hành

Giá cổ phiếu và TTCK Việt Nam đang đứng trước những thử thách cam go, ông Nguyễn Trần Bạt - Chủ tịch HĐQT, Tổng Giám đốc Invertconsult Group đặt ra vấn đề điều tra, xem xét trách nhiệm của nhà phát hành cổ phiếu, xử lý những sai phạm trên TTCK.

Thưa ông, ông đánh giá thế nào về sự sụt giảm nghiêm trọng của TTCK, do những tác động của nền kinh tế thế giới và sự phản ứng quá mức của thị trường Việt Nam, hay chính là nguyên nhân nội tại của TTCK Việt Nam?

Tôi cho rằng, hiện tượng diễn ra của nền kinh tế Việt Nam không phải do hệ quả của sự tác động từ cuộc khủng hoảng kinh tế quốc tế, mà là kết quả “thuần Việt Nam” tất yếu phải xảy ra. Nếu như không có sự xì hơi của quả bóng chứng khoán, thì quả là chúng ta đang sống trong thời đại còn có những câu chuyện thần kỳ.

Theo định nghĩa cổ điển, TTCK là nơi gặp gỡ của các ý tưởng kinh doanh và tiền, là nơi huy động tiền cho các ý tưởng kinh doanh. TTCK có nhiều thứ nhưng suy ra có hai loại hàng hoá: Thứ nhất là loại đã được đầu tư và người ta muốn thu hồi vốn. Thứ hai là bán các ý tưởng kinh doanh, gọi vốn đầu tư phát triển.

Khi tổ chức TTCK đã không xây dựng được một thể chế, cơ cấu kiểm soát chất lượng hàng hóa đem bán trên thị trường. Hầu hết Cty phát hành không được kiểm toán dựa trên các tiêu chuẩn rành mạch, để đánh giá đúng giá trị Cty. Các ý tưởng kinh doanh mới không được xem xét chất lượng. Cho nên có thể nói đó là thị trường phát triển sôi động được nhờ tâm lý đám đông.

Rất nhiều bài bình luận nói rằng sai lầm chỗ này chỗ kia trong điều hành thị trường, nhưng dù sai lầm như thế nào cũng không có tác động đủ lớn khiến thị trường đổ nhanh đến như vậy.
Nguyên nhân chính là do sự bất cẩn trong khâu chuẩn bị cho sự ra đời của một thị trường chuyên nghiệp hiện đại như TTCK. Bên cạnh đó là sự bất cẩn trong việc kiểm soát chất lượng hàng hóa, các loại cổ phiếu trên thị trường và kiểm soát nguồn tiền thu được từ thị trường. Thay vì cơ cấu gọi vốn đầu tư thì thị trường trở thành 1 cơ cấu đầu cơ quanh quẩn trong việc buôn bán các giấy tờ có giá.

Các TTCK thế giới trước khi có trạng thái chuyên nghiệp như ngày hôm nay đã trải qua lịch sử hàng trăm năm. Trải qua giai đoạn chuẩn bị cơ sở pháp lý, chất lượng hàng hoá, văn hoá kinh doanh... cho thị trường. Chúng ta bỏ qua các giai đoạn như vậy tiếp cận luôn giai đoạn đầu cơ.

Vậy trách nhiệm trước hết thuộc quản lý nhà nước, thưa ông?

Gần đây tôi thấy báo chí phê phán rằng có nhiều nhà đầu tư chứng khoán không hiểu biết mà vẫn lao vào đầu tư. Có lẽ rất nhiều người không hiểu rằng bản chất của sự phát triển TTCK là dựa trên tâm lý mù quáng mà nhiều người vẫn gọi là tâm lý đám đông. Nếu không có tâm lý mù quáng thì sẽ không có TTCK.

Sự thận trọng cổ điển của con người không phải là tâm lý tích cực đối với việc phát triển thị trường tài chính. Tính phiêu lưu, tính mạo hiểm là bản chất xã hội học của TTCK. Không thể huy động ra sàn tất cả những người hiểu biết được.

Ở đây chính là Nhà nước phải bảo hộ sự trong sạch và nghiêm minh của môi trường quản lý để bảo vệ quyền lợi của nhà đầu tư chứ không phải kêu gọi nhà đầu tư hiểu biết rồi hãy làm. Các nhà đầu tư bao giờ cũng bản năng, Chính phủ phải chịu trách nhiệm bảo vệ nhà đầu tư, bảo vệ bằng cách minh bạch quá trình đưa hàng hóa vào thị trường, bảo vệ tính minh bạch của quá trình sử dụng đồng vốn.

Trên TTCK, quan niệm lời ăn lỗ chịu rất sai lầm. Lời ăn lỗ chịu với điều kiện giấy nợ (cổ phiếu) ấy phải có giá trị, dao động giá cả nằm trong một thị trường lành mạnh.

Chúng ta quên mất mọi cổ phiếu đều là giấy nợ, các nhà phát hành đều là con nợ. Nhưng chưa thấy ai bàn trách nhiệm của con nợ, chưa ai quy án lên con nợ, chưa phân tích trách nhiệm của con nợ, mà bàn biện pháp cứu con nợ.

Ông giải thích rõ hơn và trách nhiệm của các DN phát hành?

Một trong thiếu sót của chúng ta là không xác định được trách nhiệm. Đây là một bãi thử mà ở đó mọi sự mất mát đều không quy nổi trách nhiệm. Không có phương án giải quyết các vấn đề trong trạng thái khủng hoảng. Hàng trăm hiện tượng trên TTCK, như vợ chồng ly hôn chia nhau hàng nghìn tỷ giá trị cổ phiếu.

Một lãnh đạo Cty và là cổ đông chiến lược mua nhà 52 tỷ đồng... Những thông tin như vậy đầy trên mặt báo, nhưng dường như các cơ quan thực thi pháp luật không mấy quan tâm.
Liệu Bộ Công an có bộ phận nào đủ năng lực chuyên nghiệp để điều tra những sai phạm, cơ quan công tố có bộ luật nào về sai phạm, toà án có chuyên gia nào xử những vi phạm trên TTCK? Chúng ta chưa có sự chuẩn bị cần thiết để cứu hộ thị trường lúc này để bảo vệ thị trường cũng như bảo vệ nhà đầu tư.

Tất cả các cổ phiếu rớt thảm hại, cần tổ chức điều tra ngay, trách nhiệm thị trường tới đâu, trách nhiệm của người sản xuất hàng hóa (cổ phiếu) tới đâu? Nếu phát hiện thấy sự giả mạo, có dấu hiệu lừa đảo chiếm đoạt tài sản công dân cần khởi tố. Các DN phát hành cần chứng minh được đã dùng tiền phát hành cổ phiếu đầu tư vào đâu và tài sản còn hay mất.

Trở lại vấn đề chất lượng hàng hóa, nhiều ý kiến cho rằng cần tiếp tục đẩy nhanh quá trình CPH các TCty nhà nước lớn, đưa ra thị trường những loại hàng hóa có chất lượng thay vì việc hoãn lại quá trình IPO các DN này. Ông nhìn nhận vấn đề này như thế nào?

Tôi cho rằng hoãn IPO các DN nhà nước lớn trong thời điểm này là đúng. Hơn nữa, cần phân biệt quá trình CPH và việc đem bán các hàng hóa đó trên TTCK là hai việc khác nhau. Phát hành chỉ là 1 biện pháp để CPH chứ không phải CPH.

Xin cảm ơn ông!

http://www.chungta.net/Desktop.aspx/Tac-gia/Tac-gia/Nguyen_Tran_Bat/?SearchTerms=Nguy%E1%BB%85n+Tr%E1%BA%A7n+B%E1%BA%A1t

Ba yếu tố làm nên thành công của doanh nhân

Chủ tịch, tổng giám đốc Investconsult Group - Nguyễn Trần Bạt tóm tắt thành công của mình vào 3 yếu tố: Yêu nước để có đủ sức mạnh và lòng dũng cảm; Yêu người để hiểu và dùng người; Hiểu đất nước mình và lộ trình phát triển của nó, hiểu đúng giá trị của Việt Nam trên trường quốc tế. "Tôi là một người giàu ở Việt Nam và giàu một cách chính đáng…” - ít người Việt Nam nào bộc lộ thân thế thẳng thắn đến như vậy, cho dù người đó là một doanh nhân nổi tiếng đi chăng nữa.

Những hồi ức như đan xen nhau trên gương mặt ngăm đen đầy góc cạnh của anh: “Kỷ niệm làm tôi xót xa nhất trong đời là khi con gái tôi bị bệnh bạch cầu. Tôi phải “chui” vào tổng kho dược để mua từng ống thuốc đặc trị cho con. Giá thuốc ấy ở nước ngoài đến 50 USD/lọ và con bé phải dùng 2 lọ mỗi tuần. Vợ chồng tôi bán đến những thứ cuối cùng có thể bán được nhưng vẫn không cứu nổi con. Giá một ca mổ ghép tủy ở nước ngoài lúc đó là 40.000 USD – tôi có nằm mơ cũng không thấy. Tôi đã khóc ngày đưa con đi và thề với mình rằng sẽ phải trở thành người thật giàu để không bao giờ rơi vào nỗi bất hạnh như thế…”. Anh Nguyễn Trần Bạt kể lại.


Nền tảng văn hóa

Tôi nhận ra rất sớm là kiểu gì cũng phải có học vấn và kiên quyết bắt đầu từ việc trang bị kiến thức cho mình”. Cũng thật thẳng thắn khi anh Bạt nói rằng: “Tôi thông minh và hiểu biết hơn nhiều người. Chuyên ngành học chính của tôi là cầu đường - trường đại học xây dựng nhưng 20 tuổi, tôi đã nghiên cứu rất sâu chủ nghĩa Marx và hiểu biết thật sự trong nhiều lĩnh vực kinh tế, triết học, âm nhạc rồi tốt nghiệp cả đại học ngữ văn tại chức…”. Trước câu hỏi của phóng viên: “Anh có nghĩ mình quá tự tin không?” – câu trả lời của anh rất giản dị: “Tôi nghĩ điều đó là bình thường”.

Sinh năm 1946 - tuổi Bính Tuất – quê Hưng Nguyên (Nghệ An), gia đình nội ngoại dòng dõi và giàu có tiếng, bố theo cách mạng sớm nên năm 10 tuổi anh Bạt ra Hà Nội với cha. Vừa đi học vừa bán nước ở ga Hàng Cỏ, dưới đáy giỏ sách là những cuốn sách của Maksim Gorky, Flobe, Dickens, Hecto Malo… “Những năm tháng khó khăn đó lại chính là những năm tháng dạy tôi những bài học đầu tiên, bổ ích từ trong trang sách lẫn ngoài cuộc đời” – anh Bạt nhấn mạnh. Vào bộ đội, xuất ngũ đi học tiếp rồi lại vào bộ đội trở thành sĩ quan công binh, tham gia thiết kế đường mòn Hồ Chí Minh. Giải phóng miền Nam, anh Bạt ra quân trở về viện Khoa học và công nghệ giao thông vận tải rồi quyền chủ nhiệm bộ môn Nền móng và công trình đại học giao thông vận tải, cục sáng chế… con đường dường như đã rõ cho một người nghiên cứu sâu vào khoa học. Vậy mà, anh lại ngoặt sang kinh doanh các dịch vụ tư vấn.

“Chuyện khá dài – lúc ấy tôi trọ học ở Hải Phòng…” – Anh Bạt hồi tưởng. “Luồng gió đổi mới đã làm thay đổi cả xã Minh Tâm (Kiến Thụy - Hải Phòng) nơi tôi ở. Tôi lúc ấy còn rất trẻ nhưng đã kịp hiểu. Chính tôi đã hô hào phụ huynh học sinh thay vì đóng tiền ăn cho con 5 đồng hàng tháng, góp cho chúng tôi một khoản rồi chính chúng tôi tự nuôi tôm, mua bán tôm cá, tăng gia… bằng số vốn đầu tiên đó. Kết quả là những tháng tiếp sau, chúng tôi đủ sức tự lo cho cuộc sống một cách đàng hoàng, không cần sự đóng góp của bố mẹ nữa… Đó là bước đầu tiên…”.


Một cánh cửa mở ra thế giới

Bắt đầu bằng một công ty tư vấn nhỏ năm 1989, chuyển thành công ty tư nhân năm 1992 và hiện nay, Investconsult Group là công ty tư vấn số 1 của Việt Nam với doanh thu xấp xỉ 3 triệu USD/năm, với 600 dự án đầu tư nước ngoài trên khắp các lĩnh vực từ sản xuất, cơ sở hạ tầng đến dịch vụ và bất động sản. Trên 4.000 nhãn hiệu hàng hóa, gần 600 sáng chế và trên 120 giao dịch chuyển giao công nghệ của nước ngoài vào Việt Nam đã được công ty tư vấn và đăng ký bảo hộ. Investconsult Group bao gồm một nhóm các công ty tư vấn đầu tư, luật phát triển hệ thống công chúng, dịch vụ, tài chính, quyền sở hữu trí tuệ hàng đầu tại Việt Nam… với hơn 200 cán bộ công nhân viên.

Khách hàng của Investconsult Group không chỉ là các doanh nghiệp trong nước mà còn là các tổ chức quốc tế. Anh Bạt cho rằng trong thời đại ngày nay không một cá nhân hay quốc gia nào có thể đứng ngoài xu hướng toàn cầu hóa. Và trong quá trình cạnh tranh thì nhu cầu hợp tác lại càng trở nên cấp bách hơn bao giờ hết. Cũng chính vì lý do này mà Investconsult Group chủ trương “chuyên nghiệp hóa” và “quốc tế hóa”, thể hiện trên hai khía cạnh: tích cực tham gia các công việc có yếu tố quốc tế và đưa chất lượng dịch vụ lên trình độ quốc tế. Investconsult Group có thể tự hào về mạng lưới khách hàng quốc tế của mình với nhiều tập đoàn có tên tuổi như Coca-Cola, IBM, Nec, Citibank, Deawoo.

Là một trong số ít công ty tư vấn thành lập riêng một viện nghiên cứu. Đó là một trong hai đơn vị ở công ty không hạch toán, anh Bạt cho biết. Con người khôn ngoan là con người ở trên đỉnh cao của thành công cần chuẩn bị cho sự đổi mới. Viện nghiên cứu giúp công ty tìm hiểu các chính sách, các chủ chương phát triển đất nước. Mặt khác, công ty cho biết, Việt Nam đang trong quá trình hội nhập vì vậy buộc phải nghiên cứu các vấn đề quốc tế để hiểu được quá trình hội nhập. Thông qua viện nghiên cứu, công ty tổ chức các lớp đào tạo kinh nghiệm thực tế, do các trường đại học không có giáo viên phụ trách bộ môn này. Công ty còn thành lập một trung tâm cung ứng thông tin về hội nhập miễn phí hoặc ưu đãi cho các doanh nghiệp Việt Nam.


Tư duy chính là tồn tại

Anh Bạt cho rằng công việc của mình gần với các nhà chính trị hơn là doanh nhân bởi phải đi nhiều, gặp nhiều. Anh là người thân quen của nhiều vị đại sứ, các tổ chức quốc tế và cũng chịu khó đi hội thảo: “Tôi đã tiếp khoảng 15.000 khách nước ngoài; đối thoại với 1/3 số nghị sĩ Australia, nói chuyện với 600 cử tọa là doanh nhân, trí thức Mỹ…”.

“Khi tôi mới thành lập công ty, có người cho tôi là thằng khùng nhưng tôi phớt lờ. Tôi có cái để bán và rất nhiều người mua thì tại sao không làm – đó là trí khôn. Tôi khai thác những hiểu biết để cảnh báo rủi ro và biến chúng thành dự báo. Nhưng bạn phải hiểu một điều rằng: tư vấn là một đơn vị dịch vụ chỉ bán được khi khoác lên nó một bộ quần áo văn hóa và đặt nó trong một tình huống cụ thể của cuộc sống”.

Thời gian biểu của anh Bạt: Dậy vào 9h sáng, 9h30’ hội ý với lãnh đạo công ty, 10h – 12h suy nghĩ, phân tích và dựng các kịch bản cho sự phân tích đó, 12h ăn cơm với cộng sự, 2h chiều – 7h tối tiếp khách, xử lý các “bi kịch nho nhỏ”, 8h tối ăn cơm và từ 9h – 1h sáng: đọc sách, theo dõi truyền hình, suy nghĩ và gọi điện cho con trai ở London. “Tôi lúc nào cũng suy nghĩ và suy nghĩ. Ngay cả sau một nụ hôn là lúc tôi đã bắt đầu suy nghĩ”, giống như Descartes và triết lý nổi tiếng của ông: “Tôi tư duy chính là tôi tồn tại”.

“Ai cũng chỉ có một cuộc đời – giá như có thể có nhiều hơn để cảm nhận hết cuộc sống! Và cũng chính vì điều này mà tôi sống hết mình…”, - anh Bạt nói với vẻ trầm ngâm. Khi người ta cả thấy mình có ích cho cuộc đời, dường như thời gian bao giờ cũng thiếu. Thời gian với những người như thế bao giờ cũng trôi nhanh hơn.

Phẩm hạnh là giá trị quan trọng nhất của nhân lực

"Chuyên môn không phải là tất cả sự hấp dẫn của con người. Giá trị văn hoá, hiểu biết văn hoá, sự duyên dáng trong hành vi cũng như ứng xử của các bạn chiếm vào khoảng 50% giá trị thương mại của các bạn. Trình độ chuyên môn chỉ có giá trị khoảng 15% khi các bạn tìm công việc". Kinh nghiệm của chuyên gia Nguyễn Trần Bạt.

"Văn hoá" háo danh

- Cạnh tranh toàn cầu rõ ràng cần nguồn nhân lực có chất lượng, như cách nói của ông, sự phát huy nguồn nhân lực tạo nên sự phát triển của một quốc gia. Nhưng nền giáo dục Việt Nam còn rất nhiều vấn đề. Theo ông đâu là nguyên nhân sâu xa?

Tôi không thích lắm thái độ xã hội đối với vấn đề giáo dục, đó là đổ vạ toàn bộ khuyết tật của nền giáo dục Việt Nam lên đầu Bộ Giáo dục và Đào tạo. Xã hội thích hư danh, thích bằng cấp, đấy có phải lỗi của Bộ đâu.

Bộ đôi khi còn hạn chế cả cái khát vọng thích bằng cấp của nhân dân bằng các chỉ tiêu đào tạo. Như vậy rõ ràng là Bộ hạn chế tính hư danh của xã hội chứ có khuyến khích đâu. Khuyết tật của nền giáo dục Việt Nam là khuyết tật có chất lượng văn hoá của xã hội chúng ta.

Tôi nghe đài nói về chuyện chúng ta thích học đại học. Chúng ta không đào tạo nghề, chúng ta không có các trường dạy nghề, chúng ta xem các trường dạy nghề như là một trạng thái nghỉ khi chúng ta không đỗ đại học, khi nào đỗ đại học là chúng ta bỏ ngay việc học nghề. Đấy là khuyết tật xã hội chứ không phải là lỗi của Bộ Giáo dục và Đào tạo.

Có thể lỗi của hệ thống chính trị là không nhận ra khuyết tật ấy của dân tộc, nhưng tạo ra trạng thái ấy cũng không phải là lỗi của hệ thống chính trị, bởi vì trước hệ thống chính trị này dân ta vẫn thế, vẫn thích chữ nghĩa.

Vợ thì còm cõi "quanh năm buôn bán ở mom sông, nuôi đủ năm con với một chồng", còn chồng là phải đi thi. Thi trượt thì trở thành một ông chồng khác, bất đắc chí, gàn dở. Thi đỗ thì bà vợ có thể trở thành nạn nhân của tính thích vinh hoa. Bao nhiêu truyện trong dân gian Việt Nam đã mô tả rằng nếu ông chồng mà không thành đạt thì bà vợ phải gánh một anh chồng gàn dở và bất đắc chí, nếu mà đỗ đạt thì bà vợ có một ông chồng chuẩn bị lấy công chúa... Nền văn học của chúng ta phản ánh cái trạng thái tinh thần ấy từ khi Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam chưa có, chuyện "Tống Trân, Cúc Hoa", "Lưu Bình, Dương Lễ" có từ lâu rồi.

Cho nên khuyết tật của hệ thống chính trị hiện đại của chúng ta là không phát hiện ra nhược điểm ấy của dân tộc để mà hạn chế chứ không phải họ tạo ra thói xấu của dân tộc chúng ta.

Vì vậy, tôi rất ngạc nhiên khi thấy xã hội cứ đổ bừa lên đầu mấy ông Bộ trưởng. Đấy là trạng thái đánh bùn sang ao, là đổ thừa, đấy là khuyết tật của nền văn hoá Việt Nam, của dân tộc Việt Nam, háo danh, hư danh, thích bằng cấp.

Hôm nay, tôi có một vị khách đến chơi, ông ta viết một quyển sách gọi là "Hành trang vào đời". Ông ta tặng tôi một quyển và tôi vừa mới giở xem mục lục quyển sách. Quả thật quyển sách ấy cũng có nhiều thứ thật, nào là mục ăn uống thế nào, giữ sức khoẻ thế nào, học hành thế nào... Trong lời tựa của quyển sách, ông ấy nói rằng sau thất bại trong việc khai thác 105 hecta đất ở Đồng Nai thì ông mới có thì giờ để viết quyển sách.

Không ai phê phán một người thất bại trong mặt này rồi lại làm mặt kia cả, nhưng hành trang vào đời của thế hệ trẻ là cái cách bày cho nó phải thành đạt chứ không phải là bày để cho nó tồn tại. Nếu bày cách để tồn tại thì chẳng ai bày nó cũng vẫn tồn tại.

Đừng để "bay lên" theo cách thống kê, thành tích

- Vậy chúng ta sẽ ra khỏi trạng thái đó bằng cách nào, thưa ông?

- Tôi đã viết quyển Cải cách trong đó cải cách giáo dục được xem là cuộc cải cách tạo ra sự đột phá có chất lượng cách mạng của đời sống phát triển Việt Nam. Nếu chúng ta muốn bay lên như là chương trình mà VietNamNet đang làm thì phải hiểu rằng sự bay của Việt Nam là kết quả sự bay của từng con người cụ thể của Việt Nam.

Nếu giáo dục đủ tiên tiến để giúp mỗi người Việt có khả năng, có trí tuệ, có cách thức để bay thì VN mới có thể bay được. Còn nếu không thì chúng ta đành phải bay theo cách thống kê, cách đó là tạo ra thành tích, và thành tích khi đó chỉ là kết quả của sự thống kê thôi.

Sự bay lên phải thể hiện ở chỗ hàng hoá có sức cạnh tranh; chất lượng, giá trị và hình thức sản phẩm phải đặc biệt so với Trung Quốc. Chúng ta chỉ bay nếu có cái nhìn khác, phù hợp với quy mô, kích thước và đặc điểm của VN.

Số phận tạo ra một thực tế là chúng ta sống cạnh nước Trung Hoa. Chúng ta không bắt chước họ bay lên được mà chỉ bắt chước để nhiều nhất là bằng họ nhưng không bằng được. Chúng ta không bắt chước Mỹ được bởi Mỹ xa quá, cao quá, chúng ta muốn bay còn họ thì lơ lửng trên trời từ mấy thế kỷ rồi. Cho nên cần phải cụ thể, chi tiết hơn.

Cần khẳng định hạt nhân của bay lên Việt Nam là giáo dục đào tạo bởi chúng ta có cải cách chính trị đến mấy thì cũng không thể cất cánh được nếu nhân dân vẫn là một nhân dân chậm phát triển về mặt văn hoá, chính trị và học thức.

Bay lên, chúng ta cần làm bằng cách tạo cho nhân dân có khả năng bay, khả năng ấy được tạo ra bởi giáo dục. Tất nhiên, còn nhiều thứ khác nữa. Chúng ta không thể lấy lịch sử, không thể lấy quá khứ làm thước đo, làm cái huân chương đeo trên ngực.

Tất cả những cuộc cải cách mà tôi đã viết trong cuốn "Cải cách và sự phát triển" chính là điều kiện cơ bản để xã hội Việt Nam bay lên. Nếu không có những điều ấy, đừng có hy vọng, chúng ta sẽ lại quay về với những thành tựu có chất lượng thống kê.

Thiên tài là thứ mà người sở hữu nó là người cuối cùng biết đến nó

- Mươi năm trở lại đây, người ta nói nhiều đến thuật ngữ Head-hunting, nói một cách nôm na là săn tìm người tài, tìm cách lôi kéo những người có năng lực về làm với mình. Là doanh nhân, ông có thể chia sẻ kinh nghiệm trong lĩnh vực này?

- Câu hỏi rất hay. Head-hunting là thuật ngữ chỉ bộ phận tuyển dụng cán bộ, bộ phận nhân sự của tất cả các tập đoàn kinh tế trên thế giới. Nó trở thành thuật ngữ phổ biến trong việc săn tìm nhân tài trên toàn thế giới chứ không chỉ Việt Nam. Bộ phận nhân sự của Ngân hàng HSBC họ gọi là Head-hunting Department.

Suy cho cùng, chúng ta đi làm để làm gì? Quan hệ bản chất giữa người lao động và công ty là tiền lương và sức sáng tạo hay sức lao động của người làm việc, đó là quan hệ trao đổi. Quan hệ ấy không bao giờ được nấp dưới bất kỳ danh nghĩa gì, dưới bất kỳ mỹ từ gì để che đậy bản chất cơ bản của nó. Cho nên, một người lao động muốn được quý trọng, muốn bán sức lao động của mình một cách đắt giá thì người lao động ấy phải là người lao động có giá trị sáng tạo.

Mỗi người lao động hãy chuẩn bị cho mình loại hàng hóa như vậy, loại năng lực như vậy. Không ai cấm các bạn được. Tuy nhiên, tài năng của con người thường được phát hiện bởi người khác.

Trong một quyển sách tôi đã viết "thiên tài là thứ mà người sở hữu nó là người cuối cùng biết đến nó". Cho nên, tôi nghĩ rằng cái mà bạn nghĩ là tài năng của bạn thì chưa chắc là cái tôi cần. Cái tôi cần ở bạn có thể không phải là cái bạn nghĩ.

Cho nên, tài năng của một người lao động là do người đó xác định, người đó chuẩn bị, nhưng giá trị của nó là do người sử dụng lao động phát hiện. Đôi lúc hai cái ấy không trùng nhau, cho nên mới tạo ra một khái niệm thứ ba được gọi là sự may mắn. Bạn cứ sống hồn nhiên, cứ học hành một cách tích cực và thế nào cũng có một ai đó đủ tinh khôn để phát hiện ra cái mà bạn có.

Những người như tôi chẳng hạn, trong cuộc sống không hiếm gì, nếu tôi nói với các bạn rằng những người như tôi hiếm lắm thì có nghĩa là tôi không trung thực. Biết bao con người sống rất thành công mà có cần đến tôi đâu. Biết đâu Thủ tướng phát hiện ra tài năng của bạn thì sao.

Cho nên, bạn cứ mạnh dạn chuẩn bị cho mình, số phận sẽ dẫn bạn đến với một người nào đó có đủ tài hoa để phát hiện ra và biết sử dụng tài năng thật của bạn. Bạn phải tin như thế. Còn nếu như bạn muốn làm cho tôi thì bạn cứ đến và tôi phải nói với các bạn là tôi không bao giờ khắt khe một cách thái quá đối với người lao động xét về phương diện nghề nghiệp cả. Bởi vì năng lực nghề nghiệp khi các bạn ở trường ra là chưa đủ để làm việc cho tôi. Ít nhất phải qua ba năm, tức là phải có ba năm đầu tư vào con người thì người đó mới bắt đầu làm ra các giá trị thương mại.

Phẩm hạnh là giá trị quan trọng nhất

- Vậy dưới góc nhìn của người tuyển dụng, ông sẽ ưu tiên cho những tố chất nào?

- Tôi không khắt khe về chuyên môn, nhưng tôi cực kỳ khắt khe về sự lương thiện. Nếu một người nào đã trót không lương thiện thì không qua mặt tôi được. Tôi không bao giờ tiếp nhận người không lương thiện, nếu cấp dưới của tôi có nhầm lẫn thì tôi cũng tìm cách loại bỏ. Lương thiện là phẩm chất quan trọng nhất để tôi chọn hay không chọn một cán bộ. Nếu có một người được việc nhưng không lương thiện thì người đó không phát triển.

Ở chỗ tôi, tăng lương có nghĩa là tăng địa vị, tức là người đó phải điều khiển được một nhóm lao động, gọi là team leader. Để trở thành một team leader thì phải có các phẩm hạnh, mà phẩm hạnh quan trọng nhất là sống với mọi người được, tập hợp mọi người được, lao động cùng với mọi người được và chia sẻ cùng với mọi người được. Đối với phẩm hạnh tôi rất khắt khe. Còn khả năng thì tôi phải nói rõ là tôi buộc phải đào tạo, buộc phải cung cấp các điều kiện.

Tôi không khắt khe về chuyên môn mà tôi khắt khe về phẩm hạnh vì tôi biết ai đi xa được, ai không đi xa được. Tất cả những người mà tôi đã từng đề bạt lên Giám đốc, Phó Giám đốc... khi họ không còn làm việc cho tôi nữa họ giữ địa vị rất cao trong đời sống kinh tế của đất nước.

Trợ lý của tôi trước kia bây giờ là Tổng giám đốc Ngân hàng ANZ Việt Nam, có người từng giữ vị trí Tổng giám đốc Công ty chứng khoán Sài Gòn, có cả những luật sư tốt nghiệp ở đây ra bây giờ làm việc cho Baker & McKenzie, White & Case... Tôi không giữ khi họ có đủ tài năng để có thể tìm kiếm những chân trời rộng hơn tôi, tôi luôn luôn trân trọng điều ấy. Tôi không phải là người ích kỷ tìm cách để giữ cán bộ trong vòng tay của mình, mặc dù vòng tay của mình đã bắt đầu hẹp và ngắn so với kích thước thật của họ. Vì thế, người của tôi rất có uy tín trong thị trường lao động Việt Nam.

Chuyên môn không phải là tất cả sự hấp dẫn của con người. Giá trị văn hoá, hiểu biết văn hoá, sự duyên dáng trong hành vi cũng như ứng xử của các bạn chiếm vào khoảng 50% giá trị thương mại của các bạn. Trình độ chuyên môn chỉ có giá trị khoảng 15% khi các bạn tìm công việc thôi.

Sức hấp dẫn của các bạn, sự duyên dáng của các bạn, tính chín chắn của các bạn, lòng tốt của các bạn là những đại lượng có giá trị thương mại đối với người lao động thực sự. Đấy là lời khuyên của một người đã có kinh nghiệm dày dặn trong đời sống thị trường Việt Nam, mà không phải chỉ Việt Nam, tôi còn là người có kinh nghiệm về thị trường lao động có lẽ trong phạm vi cả những nền kinh tế phát triển trên thế giới.

http://www.chungta.net/Desktop.aspx/PT-KyNang-SuNghiep/Su-nghiep/Pham_hanh_gia_tri_quan_trong_nhat/


Friday, May 15, 2009

The China Puzzle

...

Over the past decade, China and the United States have developed a deeply symbiotic, and dangerous, relationship. China discovered that an economy built on cheap exports would allow it to grow faster than it ever had and to create enough jobs to mollify its impoverished population. American consumers snapped up these cheap exports — shoes, toys, electronics and the like — and China soon found itself owning a huge pile of American dollars. Governments don’t like to hold too much cash, because it pays no return, so the Chinese bought many, many Treasury bonds with their dollars. This additional demand for Treasuries was one big reason (though not the only reason) that interest rates fell so low in recent years. Thanks to those low interest rates, Americans were able to go on a shopping spree and buy some things, like houses, they couldn’t really afford. China kept lending and exporting, and we kept borrowing and consuming. It all worked very nicely, until it didn’t.

The most obviously worrisome part of the situation today is that the Chinese could decide that they no longer want to buy Treasury bonds. The U.S. government’s recent spending for bank bailouts and stimulus may be necessary to get the economy moving again, but it also raises the specter of eventual inflation, which would damage the value of Treasuries. If the Chinese are unnerved by this, they could instead use their cash to buy the bonds of other countries, which would cause interest rates here to jump, prolonging the recession. Wen Jiabao, China’s premier, seemed to raise this possibility in March, in remarks to reporters at the end of the annual session of China’s Parliament. “We have lent a huge amount of money to the U.S.,” Wen said. “Of course we are concerned about the safety of our assets. To be honest, I am definitely a little worried.” In all likelihood, this was mostly posturing. Were China to cut back sharply on its purchase of Treasury bonds, it would send the value of the bonds plummeting, hurting the Chinese, who already own hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth. Yet Wen’s comments, which made headlines around the world, did highlight an underlying truth. The relationship between the United States and China can’t continue on its current path.

It has already helped create the global economic crisis, by splashing cheap money around the world and enabling American indebtedness and overconsumption. This country is now suffering through its worst recession since the early 1980s, one that could ultimately become the worst since the Great Depression. In China, the collapse of global trade has eliminated 20 million jobs along the industrial southern coast, according to Beijing’s official numbers. One Obama adviser told me the real number may be much higher.

So putting the global economy onto a more sustainable path will require dealing with the imbalances between China and the United States. In the broadest terms, this will mean that Americans must consume less and that Chinese must consume more. Domestically, Obama’s economic agenda is organized around the first half of this equation. He has said that economic growth must rely less on consumer spending than it has, and he is pushing for a series of investments — in education, science, medicine and alternative energy — the fruits of which are meant to replace consumption. But those fruits won’t mature as quickly as American households are paring back. For the sake of the global economy, persuading China to consume more will be crucial, too. It will also make a big difference to China’s 1.3 billion citizens. Most are still poor enough that consumption doesn’t mean yet another Barbie or iPod; it means basic comforts, like medical care and transportation.

Moving to an economy based more on consumption and less on exports happens to be the policy of the Chinese government, and has been since 2003. Its latest five-year economic plan, announced in 2006, was organized around the idea. “The biggest problem in China’s economy,” Wen said in 2007, “is that the growth is unstable, imbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable.” Remarkably, though, the Chinese economy has become even less reliant on household spending, and even more reliant on business and government spending, in recent years. Consumer spending now makes up about 35 percent of China’s gross domestic product, down from 40 percent in 2004 and almost 50 percent in the early 1990s. By comparison, the share is 54 percent in India, 57 percent in Europe and 70 percent in the United States.

The challenge for Geithner and the rest of the Obama administration, then, is persuading China to live up to its own five-year plan.

***

Given Geithner’s history with China, his tenure as Treasury secretary could hardly have gotten off to a worse start. As part of his confirmation process, senators gave him a long list of written questions. One question was from Charles Schumer, the New York Democrat who has frequently criticized China for artificially holding down the value of its currency, the renminbi, who asked Geithner whether the U.S. should confront China on the issue. Geithner replied, in writing: “President Obama — backed by the conclusions of a broad range of economists — believes that China is manipulating its currency.”

The answer immediately became the big story about the confirmation hearing. It seemed to signal that the Obama administration would take a tougher line than the Bush administration on probably the most sensitive subject between the two countries. Many Chinese leaders were incensed.

Foreign-exchange rates are maddeningly complex, but the debate over the renminbi is really just a part of the broader issue of the economic imbalances between China and the United States. When a country exports more than it imports, as China has, the value of its currency tends to rise. Exports then become more expensive (and thus decline), while imports become relatively cheap (and increase). It’s a self-correcting system that, theoretically, prevents big trade gaps between countries. But China has frequently intervened in the foreign-exchange markets to hold down the value of the renminbi and keep its exports booming. It has become less aggressive about doing so over the past few years, responding to international pressure, and the renminbi has risen more than 20 percent relative to the dollar. Still, many American economists say that it still appears to be undervalued by about 10 to 20 percent. The Chinese tend to take umbrage at this analysis, because it suggests their boom has come at the expense of others.

Against this backdrop, Geithner’s debut as Treasury secretary struck a nerve in China. It was also personally painful for him. In the four months since, he has set out to undo the damage. After the hearing, administration officials quickly put out the story that the words about manipulation weren’t really Geithner’s. They were written by a midlevel staff member, who was helping Geithner answer the hundreds of written questions from senators. Geithner, staff members said, did not mean to signal a new hard line.

Once in office, Geithner himself also began reaching out to the Chinese. “I have talked to my counterparts in China over the past few months much more than I’ve talked to my counterparts from any other country,” he told me. During the G-20 meetings in London last month, he traveled to the Mandarin Oriental Hotel for a late-night meeting in the suite of Vice Premier Wang Qishan. The two have also spoken regularly by phone. When I asked Geithner whether his language skills were good enough to make translators unnecessary, he laughed and said it had been a long time since he taught Mandarin. But he and Wang still seem to have developed a tentative rapport, thanks in part to their similar backgrounds. Wang has been nicknamed the Fireman because, like Geithner, he owes his rise to the work he has done on various economic crises. “He’s my kind of person,” Geithner said, “pragmatic” — the ultimate compliment in the Obama circle — “very direct.”

Frequent as the conversations with the Chinese have been, though, their content is telling. They have not focused on the imbalances in consumption and trade. Instead, the discussions have been about the comparatively tame issue of what the two countries have been doing to stimulate the global economy. Unlike most European countries, the United States and China have enacted big stimulus programs. Geithner has also walked Wang through the administration’s plan for bringing down the budget deficit in the future, which is meant to assuage Chinese fears that the dollar, and the value of Treasury bonds, could crash.

Since Geithner’s confirmation hearing, the Obama administration’s general approach to China has been something of a charm offensive. When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton went to Beijing in February, she made sure to avoid any suggestion that she was criticizing the government’s human rights record, as she did during a 1995 visit as first lady. At his G-20 bilateral meeting with Chinese leaders, Obama described China as “a great power,” a phrase Wen is fond of using. And when the Treasury Department issued its annual report on foreign currencies in mid-April, it concluded that China was not manipulating its currency. Instead, Geithner praised China for taking “steps to enhance exchange-rate flexibility,” a reference to the recent rise in the renminbi.

The message that has been coming from Beijing, meanwhile, has sounded almost hostile. In the weeks that followed Wen’s comments at the end of the Parliament session, Chinese leaders made clear that the aggressive posture wasn’t a one-time event. In late March, Zhou Xiaochuan — the head of China’s central bank and the senior official who’s closest to Geithner — gave a speech suggesting that the dollar be replaced as the world’s reserve currency. In late April, the minister of commerce published an op-ed in The Wall Street Journal saying that American complaints about China’s trade policy would “seriously test China-U.S. economic and trade relations.”

The most remarkable aspect of these remarks is how much of a departure they are from China’s usual stance. Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader who ushered in its market reforms starting in the late 1970s, famously gave his country the following advice: “Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”

Obama administration officials take comfort in the fact that the Chinese haven’t followed up their confrontational words with confrontational actions. This seems to indicate that the words are intended to soothe a domestic audience upset about job losses more than they are a sign of actual policy (much as Geithner’s and Obama’s rhetoric on trade is). But if nothing else, the last few months have suggested that China is no longer content to maintain a low profile.

***

When economists describe the relationship between China and the United States, it often sounds circular and even permanent. We save too little and they save too much. They export too much and we consume too much. The situation can seem to be a reflection of Chinese and American cultures, with their respective attitudes toward thrift and hedonism.

Yet the huge imbalances between the two economies are actually a very recent phenomenon. Throughout most of the 1990s, China’s current account surplus — the value of exports minus the value of imports — equaled less than 2 percent of its gross domestic product. As late as 2001, this surplus was only 1.3 percent of G.D.P. But then it began soaring. Last year, it was 10 percent of G.D.P., according to the World Bank. In more concrete terms, China sold $338 billion worth of goods to American consumers and business, more than the combined annual revenue of Microsoft, Apple, Coca-Cola, Boeing, Johnson & Johnson and Goldman Sachs. American businesses sold only $71 billion to the Chinese.

How did this happen? Nicholas Lardy, a China expert at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, compares the relationship to that of an addict and a drug dealer. Americans became hooked on cheap goods and cheap money, and China came to depend on the income from selling those goods. Chinese leaders didn’t set out with a grand plan to create an enormous trade gap, Lardy argues, but each step along the way seemed to make sense. “I think they genuinely fell into this,” he says. The authoritarian government could stifle dissent with jobs. Local party leaders were rewarded for presiding over economic growth, and exports were the easiest way to achieve it. Once the export sector was built up, the cost of allowing the renminbi to appreciate was enormous.

If you think of the exports as the first link in the causal chain, the resulting pile of Chinese savings is the second. Much of this savings has been by the corporate sector, which is subsidized by the government in all sorts of ways (an undervalued currency, low interest rates, cheap energy). The economic boom brought big profits, and companies held on to much of them. The government has also increased its savings in this decade by collecting more taxes and, until the financial crisis, running a budget surplus. And households increased their own savings in the 1990s, in reaction to the dismantling of many bloated state-run companies and the cradle-to-grave benefits, known as the “iron rice bowl,” they once provided to their workers. When a Chinese citizen is rushed to the hospital after a car accident today, the first stop for the victim’s family is often the cashier’s window. Many hospitals won’t admit patients until they have paid, and many families have no health insurance. Instead, they insure themselves, by saving.

These vast piles of savings have made up the crux of what Ben Bernanke, the Federal Reserve chairman, has called the “global saving glut.” By this telling, the imbalances can seem to be overwhelmingly China’s fault. But that’s not really the case. Just as policy makers in Beijing encouraged the rise in savings and exports, American policy makers took steps that encouraged overconsumption. They allowed incomes for most families to stagnate, which made savings a luxury that many couldn’t afford and debt a way to finance rising living standards. Alan Greenspan and, to a lesser extent, Bernanke encouraged a series of financial innovations, like cash-out mortgage refinancings and interest-only mortgages, that tempted people to spend more and save less. Washington pretended — even argued — that there was no housing bubble. As Justin Yifu Lin, a Chinese economist who became the World Bank’s chief economist last year, says, “You can’t put this all on China.”

Even more to the point, China, like the United States, is now paying a price for the two countries’ co-dependent relationship. The coastal cities that experienced tremendous booms over the past decade are struggling with mass unemployment. Millions of recent college graduates, the demographic that often starts protest movements, are unemployed across China. Stocks have fallen more sharply than they have here. These are the consequences of the unsustainable growth Wen worried about in 2007. And they provide the Obama administration with perhaps its one compelling argument for why Beijing should listen to their advice: It’s in China’s interest.

“There is symmetry,” Geithner says. “We want the world to emerge from this with a different balance of domestic and export growth, here and around the world, and we want recovery to be a little less driven by the U.S. consumer, both for our purposes as well as for the world.” A more vibrant consumer economy in China would, by definition, mean spreading more of the bounty from China’s boom to its masses, rather than allowing it to pile up in corporate or government coffers. A better safety net would give households enough peace of mind to spend their money. The Chinese consumer could begin replacing some of the spending that had been done by the once-indefatigable American consumer. This spending would benefit companies all over the world, but none more than those in China.

***

At the end of a discussion with Lardy about the imbalances between the U.S. and China, I asked him what forms of leverage he thought the Obama administration had. “We have no leverage,” he replied. He then couched this slightly, saying that the administration could threaten the Chinese with trade barriers but that such threats weren’t likely to be very credible.

Geithner had told me that he considered Lardy one of the more insightful China analysts, and so I repeated the point about leverage to Geithner and asked for his reaction. He made it clear that he essentially agreed. “When I was last in this building,” he said, referring to his time as an international expert in the Clinton Treasury Department, “I was always thinking, What’s our next point of influence, of leverage?” But he could rarely find a good one.

Geithner then mentioned reading an old newspaper interview with Michel Camdessus, the head of the International Monetary Fund in the 1990s. Camdessus’s tenure included the Asian financial crisis and Mexican peso crisis, and some European leaders were unhappy about the extent to which the I.M.F. followed the advice of American policy makers, Geithner among them, in managing these crises. Geithner recalled that when the interviewer asked about this, Camdessus replied that America had influence disproportionate to its weight in the institution only when it had an idea others were willing to follow. The Camdessus strategy — make sure you have an idea worth following — will be the Treasury Department’s approach to China.

The strategy actually dates to the Bush administration and a series of meetings with Chinese leaders that Henry Paulson, Geithner’s predecessor, helped set up. If Obama’s advisers admire one aspect of President Bush’s economic policy — and coming up with another isn’t easy — it’s the effort to nurture a relationship with China. The meetings, which began in 2006, were called the Strategic Economic Dialogue. For the first sessions, Bernanke accompanied Paulson as a demonstration of respect to the Chinese and a sign of how seriously United States viewed the agenda. American and Chinese officials are now negotiating the logistical details of the next round of the dialogue, which will be jointly led by Geithner and Clinton. Internally, officials from State, Treasury and elsewhere in the administration have been jockeying for influence over China policy. But they all seem to agree that one of the main goals of the dialogue is to bring a wide variety of important Chinese officials — including those who represent industries and regions that have benefited from the imbalances — into the same room for the talks.

During the initial 2006 meetings, in a speech at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, Bernanke laid out the essential parts of the argument that the Americans are likely to make this year. He began by ticking off what he called China’s “remarkable accomplishments”: the quintupling of per capita economic output, the lifting of 200 million people out of poverty and the like. But then, in the polite, technical manner of a central banker, he turned to its imbalances. He argued that by overinvesting in heavy industry, China had failed to grow as quickly as it could have (and to create more jobs for its people). It was devoting significantly more of its output to such investments than Japan or South Korea had during their respective rises in the 20th century, yet China was growing no faster than they had. That ran counter to economic theory and suggested, though Bernanke didn’t say so in these terms, that China was wasting resources. Rather than spreading the bounty of its boom and allowing households and businesses to find productive uses for it, China was spending so much on heavy industry and its export sector that it was necessarily propping up weak businesses. In 2006, this argument might have sounded like nit-picking. It doesn’t today.

There have recently been some signs that China has become more serious about dealing with its imbalances. For the first time since 2000, its trade surplus shrank, relative to G.D.P., last year. Late last year, China also cut taxes on fuel-efficient vehicles, which led to a surge in sales that helped Chinese consumers surpass American consumers, at least for now, as the world’s largest purchasers of vehicles. China’s economic planners also seem to have focused more in the last few years on highways and other infrastructure that would help households and sectors other than industrial ones. David Loevinger, the Treasury Department’s representative in Beijing, told me that when he visited the Great Wall recently, he drove on a highway that didn’t exist a year ago. And China has announced a plan to provide health insurance to hundreds of millions more people over the next three years. Jim O’Neill, the chief economist of Goldman Sachs, recently wrote that the health care expansion could prove to be “the most important development in the world economy.”

***

Geithner, along with other administration officials, insists that he is cautiously optimistic about the path China is on. And that’s understandable. It’s not especially pleasant to think about what the global economy will look like if China and the United States fail to fix their dysfunctional relationship.

The frequent flares of social unrest in China could spread, and the government could decide that its short-term problems take precedence over its long-term ones. It might then try to stimulate its economy at the expense of everyone else — the beggar-thy-neighbor approach — by reversing the recent rise of the renminbi, lavishing new subsidies on exporters and restricting imports. In an otherwise optimistic article in a recent issue of The Atlantic Monthly, James Fallows, an American writer living in China, pointed out that the United States followed a similar protectionist strategy during the Great Depression. As a big exporter, it felt the need to help its struggling manufacturers. Other countries soon retaliated, and the depression deepened.

For China, such a strategy would resemble a doubling down. It would benefit the same parts of the economy — the industrial sectors, the coastal south, the wealthy — that have already done the best. Living standards for the rest of China would continue to grow more slowly than the pace of economic growth suggests they should.

For the rest of the world, China’s retreat would mean slower growth. The much-anticipated day when the Chinese middle class became a global economic force would be pushed back. If China remained committed to a smokestack growth policy, the efforts to slow climate change would become all the more difficult. China’s energy needs have already caused it to become closer to the governments in Iran and Saudi Arabia, and if China moved even closer, it could further complicate the already complicated balance of power in the Middle East.

Here in the United States, we could delude ourselves into thinking that our consumer economy really was sustainable. We could put off the hard choices, and sacrifice, that will inevitably be part of building a new one. There may not be a single one of the world’s most vexing problems, in fact, that isn’t aggravated by the imbalances between the United States and China.

In an odd way, that reality makes Obama’s advisers more hopeful. Jeffrey Bader, who now runs the East Asian affairs office for the National Security Council, has pointed out that China has made a series of choices since Deng’s reforms — allowing more imports, joining international organizations, building ties with foreign governments it previously tried to overthrow — that were all “designed to be supportive of the existing order.” Geithner makes the same point: “They have a deep stake in the system now. And they recognize this.”

So it’s only reasonable to think that the United States and China will figure out how to solve their problems. Unsustainable economic trends are just that — unsustainable. But they can, unfortunately, cause a lot of damage before they are resolved.

David Leonhardt is an economics columnist for The Times and a staff writer for the magazine. His most recent article was an interview with President Obama.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/magazine/17china-t.html?_r=2&sq=leonhardt%20china%20geithner%20kissinger&st=cse&scp=2&pagewanted=all

Thursday, May 14, 2009

What Does Your Credit-Card Company Know About You?

A 2002 study of how customers of Canadian Tire were using the company's credit cards found that 2,220 of 100,000 cardholders who used their credit cards in drinking places missed four payments within the next 12 months. By contrast, only 530 of the cardholders who used their credit cards at the dentist missed four payments within the next 12 months.

Published: May 12, 2009

Rudy Santana’s day began recently, as almost all his working days begin, with a name on a screen. The name that April morning belonged to a Massachusetts man in his mid-30s. He owed money on a credit card and a second mortgage, the screen told Santana, and was separated from his wife. He was behind in paying back $28,900.97 in debt. Which was why he was on Santana’s screen.

When Santana reached him by phone, the man quickly began talking about his ex-wife. “Listen,” the man said. “I called her about this debt, and a guy picked up — a guy I’ve never heard before — and when I asked for her, he hung up on me. Can you believe that? We used that money to renovate the kitchen! And now she won’t even talk to me! Who the hell was that guy who answered the phone?”

“So you’ve spoken to your wife?” Santana asked, his voice soft and gentle. “Were you able to have a good talk with her? Even when you’re angry, it’s important to talk. Did you talk about the debt?”

“Yeah, we talked about it,” the man replied. He paused and released a small sob. “You know, she told me we would be together until we died. I know I have to pay this. But I’m not going to pay her half. I won’t damn pay it.”

“I know,” Santana said. “This is difficult, and I’ll be honest — I think you’re doing a great job. You’re really strong. But the thing is, to the bank, they don’t make a distinction between you and your wife. To them, it’s just debt. They just want to get paid.

“I think I can do something for you, though,” Santana continued, glancing at his screen. It was filled with information about the man, including the fact that he had recently sold his home at a loss. Some of this information had been sent by the man’s bank to Santana’s employer, Sunrise Credit Services, which collects delinquent debts for companies like CitigroupBank of America and HSBC. Santana’s company had added notes, too, including helpful tips — he is easier to reach in the mornings, for example — and new ways to contact him.

“Look,” Santana said. “I know you’re angry at your wife. One step to ending that anger is putting this debt behind you. It will really help you find peace. You owe about $29,000. How much do you think you can pay?”

“Well, how much are you gonna help me?” the man shot back. “These banks got all this taxpayer money from the government, and they’re the ones who ruined the market for my house! I helped bail them out. I think the banks should be paying me, instead of trying to suck all the life out of us they can!”

It was the first of numerous blowups that Santana would confront that day. Bill collectors don’t tend to encounter many pleasantries, even in the best of times. And these are nowhere near the best of times, for borrowers or for the banking and credit-card industries that lend to them. After two decades of almost constant expansion and profitability, card companies today are in deep trouble. Monstrous losses — estimated to top $395 billion over the next five years — are growing as cardholders, brought low by the recession, walk away from their debts. And Congress and President Obama are pushing for legislation that would make it much harder for companies to hike up interest rates and charge many of the sneaky fees that have been an easy source of revenue for years.

So credit-card firms are changing their business plans. Gone are the days of handing out cards willy-nilly and hoping that the cardholders who dutifully pay up will offset the losses from those who default. Today companies are focusing on those customers most likely to honor their debts. And they are looking for ways to convince existing cardholders that if they only have enough money to pay one bill, it’s wiser to pay off their credit card than, say, the phone.

Put another way, credit-card companies are becoming much more interested in understanding their customers’ lives and psyches, because, the theory goes, knowing what makes cardholders tick will help firms determine who is a good bet and who should be shown the door as quickly as possible.

Luckily for the industry, small groups of executives at most of the large firms have spent the last decade studying cardholders from almost every angle, and collection agencies have developed more sophisticated dunning techniques. They have sought to draw psychological and behavioral lessons from the enormous amounts of data the credit-card companies collect every day. They’ve run thousands of tests and crunched the numbers on millions of accounts. One result of all that labor is the conversation between Santana — a former bouncer whose higher education consists solely of corporate-sponsored classes like “the Psychology of Collections” — and the man from Massachusetts. When Santana contacted the man last month, he was armed with detailed information about his life and trained in which psychological approaches were most likely to succeed.

Eventually, the man from Massachusetts called Santana back with a proposal. He had spoken to his ex-wife, he said. They wanted to wipe out their debt by paying just $10,000 — only 35 percent of what they owed.

Santana had actually already sought permission from the bank to settle for as little as $10,000. It’s an open secret that if a debtor is willing to wait long enough, he can probably get away with paying almost nothing, as long as he doesn’t mind hurting his credit score. So Santana knew he should jump at the offer. But as an amateur psychologist, Santana was eager to make his own diagnosis — and presumably boost his own commission.

“I don’t think that’s going to work,” Santana told the man. Santana’s classes had focused on Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, a still-popular midcentury theory of human motivation. Santana had initially put this guy on the “love/belonging” level of Maslow’s hierarchy and built his pitch around his relationship with his ex-wife. But Santana was beginning to suspect that the debtor was actually in the “esteem” phase, where respect is a primary driver. So he switched tactics.

“You spent this money,” Santana said. “You made a promise. Now you have to decide what kind of a world you want to live in. Do you want to live around people who break their promises? How are you going to tell your friends or your kids that you can’t honor your word?”

The man mulled it over, and a few days later called back and said he’d pay $12,000.

“Boom, baby!” Santana shouted as he put down the phone. “It’s all about getting inside their heads and understanding what they need to hear,” he told me later. “It really feels great to know I’m helping people in pain.”

***

To understand how the credit-card industry got interested in psychology, you have to go way back, to a time when many Americans didn’t have a credit card, when almost every company charged the same interest rate regardless of a cardholder’s riskiness and when people often paid off their entire balance each month. All the way back, that is, to the 1980s.

Just a little more than two decades ago, the credit-card business was a quiet, slightly boring industry dominated by banks looking for easy revenue. Card issuers made money by collecting annual dues and interest payments from cardholders as well as fees from merchants each time a customer used a card. Then the math whizzes arrived. They emphasized that the biggest profits didn’t come from people who always paid off their bills but rather from less-responsible clients who never paid their entire balance, and thus could be milked through silently skyrocketing interest rates, late fees and other penalties. Since 1995, the percentage of the industry’s income from cardholder fees has more than doubled to 40 percent. In 2005, as the push to sign up cardholders peaked, the industry sent out more than 10.2 billion credit-card solicitations, which would cover more than the entire world’s population. Two years later, card companies collected $40.7 billion in profits before taxes, according to R. K. Hammer, a credit-card advisory firm. Today Americans carry an average of 5.3 all-purpose cards in their wallets, and the average household has $10,679 in credit-card debt, according to the industry publication The Nilson Report.

But giving credit cards to riskier customers posed a problem: How do you know which cardholders will pay something each month, providing fat profits, and which will simply run up a huge tab and then disappear?

The Ph.D.’s arrived at two solutions. The first was to create thousands of new kinds of cards with their own credit limits, terms and interest rates. Such a strategy theoretically protected companies by limiting how much a cardholder could buy and by charging sufficiently high interest rates to ensure that if a few cardholders walked away, the companies still made plenty of money.

The other solution was learning to predict how different types of customers would behave. Card companies began running tens of thousands of experiments each year, testing the emotions elicited by various card colors and the appeal of different envelope sizes, for instance, or whether new immigrants were more responsible than cardholders born in this country. By understanding customers’ psyches, the companies hoped, they could tell who was a bad risk and either deny their application or, for those who were already cardholders, start shrinking their available credit and increasing minimum payments to squeeze out as much cash as possible before they defaulted.

The exploration into cardholders’ minds hit a breakthrough in 2002, when J. P. Martin, a math-loving executive at Canadian Tire, decided to analyze almost every piece of information his company had collected from credit-card transactions the previous year. Canadian Tire’s stores sold electronics, sporting equipment, kitchen supplies and automotive goods and issued a credit card that could be used almost anywhere. Martin could often see precisely what cardholders were purchasing, and he discovered that the brands we buy are the windows into our souls — or at least into our willingness to make good on our debts. His data indicated, for instance, that people who bought cheap, generic automotive oil were much more likely to miss a credit-card payment than someone who got the expensive, name-brand stuff. People who bought carbon-monoxide monitors for their homes or those little felt pads that stop chair legs from scratching the floor almost never missed payments. Anyone who purchased a chrome-skull car accessory or a “Mega Thruster Exhaust System” was pretty likely to miss paying his bill eventually.

Martin’s measurements were so precise that he could tell you the “riskiest” drinking establishment in Canada — Sharx Pool Bar in Montreal, where 47 percent of the patrons who used their Canadian Tire card missed four payments over 12 months. He could also tell you the “safest” products — premium birdseed and a device called a “snow roof rake” that homeowners use to remove high-up snowdrifts so they don’t fall on pedestrians.

Testing indicated that Martin’s predictions, when paired with other commonly used data like cardholders’ credit histories and incomes, were often much more precise than what the industry traditionally used to forecast cardholder riskiness. By the time he publicized his findings, a small industry of math fanatics — many of them former credit-card executives — had started consulting for the major banks that issued cards, and they began using Martin’s findings and other research to build psychological profiles. Why did birdseed and snow-rake buyers pay off their debts? The answer, research indicated, was that those consumers felt a sense of responsibility toward the world, manifested in their spending on birds they didn’t own and pedestrians they might not know. Why were felt-pad buyers so upstanding? Because they wanted to protect their belongings, be they hardwood floors or credit scores. Why did chrome-skull owners skip out on their debts? “The person who buys a skull for their car, they are like people who go to a bar named Sharx,” Martin told me. “Would you give them a loan?”

Some credit-card companies began using these and other discoveries to find new customers and to scrutinize existing cardholders. A few firms began sending offers to people who had registered for baby showers or weddings, for example, since data showed that getting married or having a child — in addition to making people buy lots of new stuff — often also makes them more responsible. Other companies started cutting cardholders’ credit lines when charges appeared for pawnshops or marriage therapy because data indicated those were signs of desperation or depression that might lead to job loss.

But on the whole, companies, including Canadian Tire, stuck to more traditional methods of managing risk, like raising interest rates when someone was late paying a bill, because they worried that customers would revolt if they found out they were being studied so closely.

“If you show us what you buy, we can tell you who you are, maybe even better than you know yourself,” said Martin, who now works for Wal-Mart Canada. “But everyone was scared that people will resent companies for knowing too much.”

Then last year, the economy blew up. Three things became obvious very quickly. First, all those extra charges that theoretically protected credit-card companies from losing money? Well, the worst-case models were way off, and some companies started hemorrhaging cash. Second, many of the predictions that card companies built around their understandings of people’s psyches were surprisingly accurate, even during an economic tsunami. And finally, when people start losing their jobs and feeling poor, it suddenly becomes very, very important to figure out how to persuade them to pay their credit-card bills.

Data-driven psychologists are now in high demand, and the industry is using them not only to screen out risky debtors but also to determine which cardholders need a phone call to persuade them to mail in a check. Most of the major credit-card companies have set up systems to comb through cardholders’ data for signs that someone is going to stop making payments. Are cardholders suddenly logging in at 1 in the morning? It might signal sleeplessness due to anxiety. Are they using their cards for groceries? It might mean they are trying to conserve their cash. Have they started using their cards for therapy sessions? Do they call the card company in the middle of the day, when they should be at work? What do they say when a customer-service representative asks how they’re feeling? Are their sighs long or short? Do they respond better to a comforting or bullying tone?

“It’s really hard to get clean insights of a cardholder’s state of mind,” said Andy Jennings, the head of research and development at FICO, one of the biggest and oldest analytic firms. “The more subtle the insight, the more cleverness finding it requires. If someone pays for a big cable television package each month with their card, are they rich? Or does it signal they don’t have the sense to avoid products they can’t afford? If they check their balance three times a day, are they worried or uptight? We may look at 300 different characteristics just to predict their delinquency risk.”

If a credit-card company detects unsettling patterns, it might start cutting credit lines, raising interest rates or accelerating repayment schedules. (Companies are expected to withdraw $2.7 trillion of credit by the end of 2010, according to a March report from the Meredith Whitney Advisory Group, a banking-analyst firm.) But the most useful information the card companies are deriving from their data are the insights that help them deepen their relationships with customers, particularly when a cardholder is going through a rough time. One of the strongest conclusions of the psychological studies is that cardholders are most likely to pay the bills of those companies with which they have an emotional connection.

“Today the goal is for customers to get a warm-and-fuzzy feeling from their credit-card company,” said Carl Pascarella, a former chief executive of Visa USA. “If we have a deep relationship with you over a range of products and experiences, if we trust each other, you’ll listen when we give you advice.”

***

It was the first day of training for Bank of America’s newest credit-card customer-assistance employees, and some of the 12 new hires sitting around the classroom were a little confused.

At another company, these employees — who earn about $35,000 a year — might be called “collection agents” or “at-risk account reps.” But at Bank of America, “our whole program is built around assisting the customer,” explained Ric Struthers, president of the credit-card division. “We call it assistance, because we’re here to find a solution.”

To see how one company transforms thousands of low-paid employees into telephone psychiatrists, I attended a day of Bank of America’s four-week training program at the company’s Delaware offices. (I was allowed to attend on the condition that I neither identify nor interview the trainees during the course.) At the front of the classroom, a poster explained the company’s “Customer Delight Model.” The trainees were supposed to “provide a delightful opening,” “employ delightful words,” “acknowledge and empathize” and “personalize with a POWER close.” They spent the morning discussing hypothetical cases, like a cardholder with twins whose husband announced he had fallen in love with another woman. He handed over divorce papers, had a moving truck outside and in short order took over the house and left the cardholder with two kids, only $400 a week and a ton of credit-card debt.

“I would tell her to castrate the man,” one trainee said to the others in her assigned group. “You know, Mel Gibson is getting a divorce, and what he’s doing to that poor woman, he should get his gut hacked up with a rusty knife. I would tell her to cut the husband where it matters, and then ask the new girlfriend what she thinks of what’s down there now!”

These were not, apparently, the “delightful words” that Bank of America had in mind. A much younger male trainee opined that there might be more delicate ways of handling the conversation.

“What do you know?” the woman retorted. “You’ve never been married! You spent your whole life on vacation! Why don’t you learn something instead of moving your mouth all the time?”

Score one for the power close.

As the class discussed how to talk to someone who has recently lost her husband or her job, a young man raised his hand.

“Uh, when we hear a story like this, how are we going to ask them for money?”

“We’ll get to that later,” the instructor, Sheri Roberts, replied.

Then the trainees listened to a recording of an actual call with a cardholder who was about $10,000 in debt, divorced and couldn’t pay her bills. The Bank of America representative was chipper and positive and after 10 minutes offered to cut the woman’s minimum monthly payments in half and drop her interest rate to 5 percent.

“Oh, my God,” the cardholder sobbed on the tape. “Oh, that would help so much. I’m not a bad person.”

“No, of course you aren’t,” the representative replied. “We’re going to figure this out together.”

Such conversations, credit-card companies say, happen all the time. Indeed, just days earlier I spoke to Donna Tiff, a 49-year-old Missouri woman. We were introduced through the Center for Responsible Lending, an advocacy organization that Tiff contacted after companies began hounding her about the $40,000 she owed on multiple cards.

“The phone would ring nonstop,” she told me. “I would get on, crying, and tell them I don’t believe in suicide, but I’m close. That I’m going to file for bankruptcy, and then you’ll get nothing.”

And then Tracey came along. She worked for a company that today is a subsidiary of Bank of America. Tracey had talked to Tiff several times and noticed that there was a mistake on her account — an automatic payment was going to be deducted twice from her checking account. If that happened, Tiff’s other checks would bounce.

“I told her, thank you so much for catching that,” Tiff recalled. “And then we talked for over an hour about my problems and raising kids. She was amazing. She was so similar to me. She gave me her direct number and said that I should call her directly anytime I had any questions or just needed to talk about what was going on.”

Over the next three years, Tiff paid off the entire $28,000 she owed Bank of America and spoke regularly with Tracey, she said. And the $12,000 she owed on other cards? Well, those companies didn’t have a Tracey. They never got fully repaid.

It’s a heartwarming story. Unless you’ve seen how people like Tracey are schooled in the art of bonding. What are the odds that the random customer assistant who dealt with Tiff would have so much in common with her and manage to strike such a close bond? I tried to call Tracey myself, using the information Tiff provided. But I was told she didn’t work there anymore.

One Bank of America executive acknowledged that Tiff — and the caller on the recording in the training course — probably could have cut her debt in half just by asking. Much of what they’re paying, after all, is fees and interest that Bank of America itself tacked on.

“Some cardholders are not as savvy as others,” said Tony Allen, a company spokesman, who added that the company tries to educate cardholders about their options. “I’m sure some people feel like we have conflicted interests and that we’ll only educate as much as it helps us get paid. But we take our responsibility seriously.”

I asked Tiff if she ever asked Tracey to write off the late fees and the interest charges.

“Oh, no,” she told me. “She was so kind to me. How could I ask her for something like that?”

***

If you ask credit-card executives about the current financial crisis, they’ll admit things aren’t good right now. But what really has them worried is what’s going on in Washington.

Just last month, President Obama invited 14 credit-card executives to the Roosevelt Room and told them he planned to ask Congress to outlaw “anytime, any-reason rate boosts and late-fee traps” and to increase scrutiny of the industry. A week later, the House passed the “Credit Cardholders’ Bill of Rights” by a margin of 287 votes. The legislation would force companies to give advance notice of interest-rate hikes, ban most retroactive rate increases and stop companies from issuing cards to people under 18 years old. And if that fails to become law, in 2010 new Federal Reserve Board rules will bar issuers from changing interest rates on existing balances in most cases. In other words, once you get a credit card, it will be much harder for the company to suddenly start charging you more.

The industry has responded by warning that interest rates will rise for everyone. Already, some issuers, including American Express, Bank of America and Citigroup, have started rejecting more card applications. You’re almost sure to get fewer offers in the mail, and the days of interest-free cards for six months (followed by soaring interest rates) are probably gone.

Despite their woes, it’s hard to feel sorry for the card companies. A survey conducted last year by Consumer Action, an advocacy group, revealed that the average penalty interest rate for cardholders who had missed a payment was 26.87 percent. And for years companies have also denied consumers the right to go to court by requiring arbitration, have aggressively marketed to college students and have adopted policies like “universal default,” which allows them to hike your interest rate if you miss a payment on a card issued by a completely different company. Some of their innovations, like cash-back rewards for unpaid balances, were designed to get cardholders to stop paying the full amount they owe.

Meanwhile, as they prepare for an uncertain future, the card companies are scurrying to find the next breakthroughs in credit-card psychology. Take, for instance, Capital One’s Card Lab, a festive Internet site that lets customers design their own cards. I ordered one with my son’s photo on it.

The site is interactive. If I indicate I don’t want to pay an annual fee, for instance, the Web site tells me I must pay a higher interest rate. If I want a low rate, the site tells me I can’t get any rewards points. In essence, the Web site offers a series of choices that determine the relative values I place on different options. Capital One can watch as I navigate the site, learning more and more about me. The industry doesn’t have to drop rats in a maze anymore. We’ve started going there on our own.

“Card Lab is at some level an enormous real-time, ongoing experiment,” says Jack Forestell, senior vice president of marketing and analytics at Capital One. By observing people’s choices and then tracking how they use their cards, the company has learned who is more willing to pay annual fees and who wants airline miles badly enough to pay higher interest rates. “We’ve learned interesting things, like people are more loyal to cards that have their kids’ photos on them,” Forestell says.

What the card companies realize — and what legislation most likely won’t change — is that no matter how much we say we dislike credit cards, they’ve become an essential part of our lives. It’s really hard to rent a car without a card. Or shop online. Or buy plane tickets. Often, executives say, we are just looking for an excuse to use our cards, and so companies are becoming experts in figuring out which excuses we each most want to hear. They’ve let me transform my card into an expression of love for my son. They’ll let you tell yourself that charging a meal gets you closer to a free flight to Tahiti.

Before I left the Bank of America training session in Delaware, the instructor gave the class a little pep talk.

“You’re going to have some days when you help customers, and you’re going to walk out and feel really, really good,” she told them. “It’s O.K. to help people know that we are all working to make the world a better place. It’s O.K. to help them believe.”

Then she turned to the young man who had previously inquired about bringing up the indelicate topic of money with someone who had just lost her job, her house or her husband.

“We are the ones who let them know that there’s always a brighter tomorrow,” she told him. “That’s how we get paid back.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/magazine/17credit-t.html?pagewanted=6&partner=rss&emc=rss